















We analyze recent efforts at international cooperation to limit illegal migration, 
particularly through the use of legal migration avenues like guest worker (GW) schemes. 
We show that while GW schemes may be desirable in themselves as an avenue of 
international migration, they are an inefficient instrument to induce cooperation on illegal 
migration. On the one hand, GW schemes suffer from a negative selection problem 
relative to illegal migration, which tends to erode their attractiveness to source countries. 
On the other hand, GW schemes increase total (legal and illegal) migration which make 
them a costly compensating device for the host country. Moreover, GW schemes create 
additional pressure on host countries to implement tough laws against illegal immigration 
even when the host finds such laws per se undesirable. Thus, less favorable treatment of 
illegal immigrants, as in California Proposition 187, may be an inevitable rather than 
incidental outcome of reliance on guest worker schemes. In contrast, countries that are 
willing to use transfers and other forms of economic assistance to induce source countries 
to cooperate can afford relatively liberal treatment of illegal immigrants. 
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d“It is time for an immigration policy that permits temporary guest workers to ﬁll jobs Ameri-
cans will not take, that rejects amnesty, that tells us who is entering and leaving our country,
and that closes the border to drug dealers and terrorists.” — President George W. Bush, State
of the Union Address, February 2, 2005.
Introduction
Few issues concern policy-makers in industrial countries more today than the problem
of illegal migration. President George W. Bush’s recent call for a new immigration policy
reﬂects a widespread belief that the current immigration system is broken. In the United
States alone, the population of illegal immigrants is estimated to be currently around 11
million, and every year another 500,000 or so illegal immigrants arrive.1 The problem and
the President’s proposal are not new, nor is the problem speciﬁc to the U.S. What is new is
the realization that combating illegal migration will be diﬃcult and even impossible without
the eﬀective cooperation of source countries. The feasibility of such cooperation, and how
source countries can be induced to participate in combating illegal migration, is the subject
of this paper.
1 Sidney Weintraub, Financial Times, April 17th, 2005.
1Several partnership agreements on illegal migration between host and source countries
have been concluded or are being considered. For example, exchange of information on mi-
grant smuggling is promoted by means of technical cooperation agreements between Japan
and Korea, Japan and China, Hong-Kong, China and the US, the EU and some of its neigh-
bors. Readmission agreements are being used to facilitate the return of illegal immigrants
back to their countries of origin or transit, and are elements of the dialogue between a cluster
of South Caucasus and Western European countries (OECD, 1999; page 74). Highlighting
the importance of such agreements, a report by the Council of Europe (1997) noted that
“the return of illegal migrants can be made eﬀective only through the full co-operation of the
authorities of the country of origin and, as appropriate, of those of the transit countries.”
The report goes on to recommend that “readmission clauses, relating to both nationals and
third country citizens, be inserted in general co-operation agreements with countries which
are sources of irregular migration, such as agreements relating to economic or political co-
operation.”2
The Binational Study on Migration (1997) conducted jointly by the U.S. and Mexico has
also emphasized the need for a joint eﬀort by the two countries to resolve the problem of illegal
migration. There is already evidence suggesting that Mexico can play an important role in
this respect. For example, the government of the Mexican state Baja California Norte has
taken the initiative of designating zonas de exclusion (oﬀ-limit areas) at especially treacherous
border areas and stationed agents to prevent illegal crossings. Although these measures are
limited in scope, they have signiﬁcantly boosted United States’ eﬀorts at securing part of its
2 Chinese oﬃcials have also accepted US demands to pursue smugglers more aggressively and to impose
severe punishment on illegal immigrants (Djajic, 2001, page 150).
2border with Mexico. Leiken (2002) notes that “were Mexico to share responsibility for border
safety, the Southwest border strategy would have a real chance of success. Mexico would have
to implement all along the border the policy currently applied by the state of Baja California
Norte and take the further step of actually detaining those who repeatedly enter oﬀ-limits
zones.”
A key issue is how source countries can be induced to participate in such eﬀorts. In this
paper, we consider two possibilities. Firstly, source countries could be compensated for their
eﬀort by direct monetary transfers or concessions in other areas as has been recommended
by the Council of Europe. The second option is an expanded guest-worker (GW) scheme to
compensate source countries, which seems to be the option under consideration in the U.S.-
Mexico case. For example, Rosenblum (2005, p. 6) argues that “a new guest worker program
should be structured as bilateral between the United States and Mexico” and in exchange for
a new guest worker (GW) treaty the U.S. should demand “as u b s t a n t i a l l ye x p a n d e dM e x i c a n
role in discouraging undocumented emigration.” In the sections that follow we analyze the
potential use of GW schemes, derive implications for the structure of cooperation and contrast
the results with those obtained when transfers are used.
GW schemes can, of course, directly lead to a decline in illegal migration by oﬀering at
least some of those who would have migrated illegally an avenue for legal migration. But
our results reveal that the use of GW schemes to compensate source countries for their
cooperation is fraught with problems, and such a policy is not the ﬁrst-best compared to,
for example, monetary transfers. The second best nature of such schemes is closely related
to the preference structure of source and host countries. First of all, except in the unlikely
3circumstances where legal migration can be perfectly targeted, legal migration increases total
(legal and illegal) migration which makes it a costly compensating device for a host country
that is averse to further immigration.3 Secondly, from the source country perspective,
GW schemes suﬀer from a negative selection problem compared to illegal migration, in that
such schemes are likely to attract those for whom the cost of migrating is relatively high.
(This phenomenon is merely the ﬂip side of the positive selection in illegal migration which
attracts those who have low migration costs and therefore less to lose from making multiple
illegal attempts.) This aspect of GW schemes erodes their relative attractiveness for source
countries. Sustaining mutually beneﬁcial cooperation through GW schemes is therefore
diﬃcult and more costly than through direct transfers from host to source.
We also ﬁnd that under plausible conditions, cooperation through guest worker schemes
creates a stronger incentive for the host to implement tough laws against illegal immigrants
than cooperation through transfers or no cooperation at all. In the absence of cooperation,
the host determines optimal treatment of illegal immigrants, balancing the beneﬁts of deter-
ring illegal immigration against the social costs of implementing harsh and discriminatory
policies. With cooperation, the incentive to implement tough laws increases because they
provide the additional beneﬁt of reducing the compensation that the host needs to make
to the source. Since GW schemes have a higher social cost than transfers, there is an even
stronger incentive to economize on this form of compensation by toughening laws.
These results have implications for policy. While GW schemes may be desirable in
themselves as an avenue of international migration, they are an ineﬃcient instrument to in-
3 As Sidney Weintraub notes, “The belief that a large guest worker programme would eliminate the need
f o rb o r d e rs u r v e i l l a n c ei sﬁction; the allowed number of such workers would never be enough to accommodate
all who wished to emigrate.” (Financial Times; April 17th, 2005)
4duce cooperation on illegal migration. International cooperation on illegal migration is more
eﬀectively sustained through direct transfers from host to source countries. Such transfers
have the additional virtue of creating less pressure on host countries than GW schemes to
implement laws that treat illegal immigrants less favorably.
The existing literature on illegal migration has paid little attention to the issues men-
tioned above. By and large the focus has been on unilateral actions taken by host countries to
combat illegal immigration rather than on international cooperation. Ethier (1986a, 1986b)
pioneered the new model of illegal immigration by analyzing the eﬀect of border and internal
enforcement schemes implemented by the host country. Bond and Chen (1987) extended the
Ethier model to examine the impact of interior inspections by the host country’s government
on the welfare of the host country when capital is internationally immobile, while Yoshida
(2000) analyzed the case when capital is internationally mobile. Myers and Papageorgiou
(2000) derived the optimal level of border enforcement from the host country’s point of view
when illegal immigrants can and cannot be excluded from costly public services. Bandopad-
hyay and Bandopadhyay (1998) focused on the impact of employer sanctions by the host
on the welfare of the source country while Gayton-Fergoso and Lahiri (2000) considered the
eﬀect of foreign aid on illegal immigration. The present paper diﬀers from all these studies
by focusing squarely on cooperation between countries to regulate illegal migration.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 we outline the basic structure of the
model. In section 2 we derive the non-cooperative solution to the game. International
c o o p e r a t i o nw i t ht r a n s f e r si sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n3 .S e c t i o n4d e a l sw i t hc o o p e r a t i o nw i t h o u t




Consider a game with two countries called source (s)a n dh o s t( h). Total population in
each country is normalized to unity. There is a single aggregate good in the world produced
with labor alone. Each agent in h,s produces wh,w s units of the good, respectively. wh,w s
are treated as parameters of the model and interpreted as the wage rates with λ ≡ wh − ws
as the wage diﬀerential.
As in the broader literature on illegal migration, border enforcement measures play an
important role in our model too. The key point in our model is that the host cannot
acting alone prevent illegal migration beyond a certain level, and that cooperation by source
countries can help relax this constraint. We capture this feature in the simplest possible
way by using a variant of the “costless border enforcement” model analyzed, for example, in
Myers and Papageorgiou.4 Let p ∈ [0,1) denote the probability that an agent is caught
while attempting to cross the border illegally. The host can costlessly implement any p
value in the interval [0, ¯ p] where ¯ p<1 is exogenously given and may depend on factors
such as the geographical proximity of the two countries, and the size of network eﬀects, etc.
4 We also used a border enforcement model where the cost to host of patrolling the border rises with p
and found the main eﬀects remain the same.
6Cooperation by the source country involves a ﬁxed cost of E∗
s ≥ 0 to source and it relaxes
the upper bound on p from ¯ p to p∗ where 1 >p ∗ > ¯ p.5
Next we introduce the cost of migration. We assume that each time an agent attempts to
cross the border, successfully or not, he incurs a cost C where C is uniformly distributed over
[0,1] across the source country populace.6 As we show later, this structure of migration cost
implies that the cost of legal and illegal border crossing diﬀers because the former involves
only one attempt while the latter involves multiple attempts. We discuss this point in more
detail and provide some supporting evidence in section 2. Having crossed the border, an
illegal alien may face other costs (because of his illegal status) which we will denote by η ≥ 0.
Examples of such internal costs include: diﬃculty in inviting family members, exploitation
by employers, denial of basic labor rights, and limited access to public services and goods
as for example in recent U.S. laws like California Proposition 187, Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act as well as the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act. These internal costs, at least to some extent, are determined
by the policy of the host country and will be treated as an endogenous policy variable. A
higher η value reﬂects higher internal cost arising from tougher laws against illegal immigrants
present in the host country.
5 There is some evidence to suggest that it may be diﬃcult to push p beyond a certain limit at least in
the short run. For example, the General Accounting Oﬃce in its 2001 report noted that the border patrol
had been unable to meet the Southwest strategy personnel demand because of its concern that the ratio of
inexperienced-to-experienced agents was getting too high (Leiken 2002, pp. 11-12).
6 It does not matter for our results whether heterogeneity arises in the cost (economic and non-economic) or
the diﬀerences in the earning potential (wage diﬀerential) of the migrants. What matters is the net expected
beneﬁt from migration. This can be seen by noting that C and λ enter symmetrically in the net beneﬁtf r o m
migration.
71.2: The host country problem
Illegal immigration poses a number of problems to the host country which, in the context
of this paper, can be broadly classiﬁed into two groups. Firstly, illegal immigration may be
a problem simply because it leads to excessive or unwanted immigration. Secondly, illegality
per se may pose additional problems to the host. Immigration may be unwanted because
it leads to unemployment in the host country (Ethier 1986, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller
1998), sectoral or regional displacement of natives (Hatton and Tani 2003), politically un-
favorable factor price movements (Ethier 1986a,b), ﬁscal pressure (Myers and Papageorgiou
2000)7 , sociocultural and linguistic diﬀerences which may adversely aﬀect local cultures and
life-styles (Bliss 1994, Schiﬀ 1992).8 These adverse eﬀects from immigration are not due to
the illegality of migration but simply because of excessive immigration. Thus, these costs
are common to legal and illegal aliens and are referred to as the “social cost” from legal
migration.
The additional cost of illegality most obviously relates to the greater likelihood of crime
and the increased threat to national security. The cost of illegality to the host may depend
on its policies towards illegal aliens. For example the denial of access to medical services can
create a health hazard, denial of access to the formal labor market can push immigrants into
the underground economy, and exclusion from labor unions can lead to social tensions.9
7 Also see, for example, Lee and Miller 2000, Auerbach and Oreopolis 2000, Storesletten 2000 and Borjas
1999.
8 Other studies which analyze the impact of immigration on local culture include Putnam 1995, Carlton
1995, Coleman 1987, 1988, 1990, Knack and Keefer 1997, etc.
9 For example, Costich (2001-02) argues that measures such as the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act which
were implemented in 1996 and severely limited health care access to undocumented immigrants in the U.S.,
are likely to have adverse health consequences for all U.S. residents.
8Furthermore, the discriminatory treatment of illegal immigrants through tough laws (high η
value) can reduce native welfare for humanitarian reasons. These examples suggest that the
social cost from illegal migration is greater than that from legal migration and it is increasing
in η. However, the opposite case is also possible. For example, illegal immigrants do not
bring their families and dependents with them implying a lower ﬁscal burden on the host
country, are willing to take jobs which the natives and legal immigrants do not want, work
below minimum wages yielding a larger surplus to the native employers, and impose a smaller
ﬁscal burden on the host country when they do not have full access to public services and
goods. While the full range of possibilities presents a rich case, we will focus on the former,
more relevant possibility.
Let SL(SI) denote the social cost from legal (illegal) immigration which is the loss in the
aggregate welfare of the natives of the host country from each legal (illegal) immigrant. We
assume that SL is an exogenously given parameter but S 
I(η) ≡ dSI/dη ≥ 0 and SI(η) ≥ SL.
That is, the social cost of illegality is increasing in η.B y d e ﬁnition, the pure cost of illegality
to host is equal to SI − SL.
Section 2: Unilateral policies
In this section we analyze the case when the two countries set their policies unilaterally.
The game proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst stage (the government of) the host country decides
to implement a value of η ∈ [0,η1]. W i t ht h i si np l a c ew ep r o c e e dt os t a g e2w h e r et h eh o s t
9implements p,L where L is the number of legal immigrants invited by the host (size of the
GW scheme). Simultaneously, the source chooses Es ∈ {0,E∗
s}10 .N o t e t h a t t h e c h o i c e
of η is irreversible in stage 2. The motivation for this is that while border enforcement
measures and GW schemes can be adjusted in the short run, policy decisions on the rights of
illegal immigrants are based on deeply-rooted beliefs and typically require a lengthy political
process.11 The solution below is obtained by backward induction.
2.1: Illegal migration function
Treat η as given and consider the second stage of the game. Since migration must be
privately beneﬁcial, all agents with C<λ will apply for the GW scheme. We assume that
agents are selected randomly for the scheme. That is, the selection is independent of an
agents’ intention to migrate illegally or not if he were not selected.12 Next, agents who are
not selected for the GW scheme decide whether to migrate illegally or not. Computing the
expected net beneﬁt from migrating illegally relative to staying home, we get that all agents
not selected for GW scheme and with C<˜ λ(1 −p) will migrate illegally where ˜ λ ≡ λ−η.13
10 T h ec h o i c eo fEs is simply the source country’s decision to unilaterally control illegal migration by
investing E
∗
s or do nothing (Es =0 ).
11 Part of the reason for this may be that such measures are viewed by many in host countries as unfair and
a reward for violating the national law while for others it is a humanitarian issue. With such sharp diﬀerences
amongst natives, it may take long to implement changes in either direction. Johnson (1998) lends some
support to this idea when analyzing the possibility of ending discrimination and exploitation of Mexicans in
the U.S. he states that: “Unfortunately, signiﬁcant evidence suggests that it would not be [possible], at least
under the present political, economic and social conditions.”
12 The assumption is natural since it is unlikely that the government in either country will have complete
information on an agent’s migration cost, although it may know the overall distribution of C. It is possible
that the source country may be able to screen agents by their cost. We abstract from this unlikely possibility.
13 Interpretation of the previous inequality is as follows: if an agent decides to migrate then with probability
1−p he will be successful in crossing the border in which case he will earn wh −η; further, with probability p
he will be caught in which case he returns home and earns ws. In either case he incurs a cost of C. He will
attempt migrating illegally if and only if the expected beneﬁt from doing so is higher than the beneﬁtf r o m
10Solving for the level of illegal migration we get that it is equal to
I = I(p,L) ≡ I(p,0)[1 − L/λ] ...... (1)14
I(p,0) = ˜ λ(1 − p) ...... (2)
Assumption 1: 0 < λ < 1. The assumption is necessary and suﬃcient for migration to be
strictly interior when p = η =0and we treat it as a regular interior solution condition.15
2.2 Welfare and GW schemes
Let Ws,W h denote the welfare of the source and host country, respectively. We have
Ws = ws + λL/2+˜ λI/2 − Es
Interpretation of the expression for Ws is as follows. For any given L, all agents with
C ∈ [0,λ] apply for legal migration. Since agents are randomly selected for the GW scheme,
the migration cost of the average legal migrant equals λ/2 and his surplus (net beneﬁt) is
also equal to λ/2. This explains the coeﬃcient of L. Now consider illegal migrants. These
staying home. That is, (1 − p)(wh − η) − C + pws >w s.
14 As in the broader literature on illegal migration we have assumed that an agent who is caught at the
border can attempt to migrate illegally again and again. Consequently there is no distinction in our model
in the number of people who attempt illegal migration and those who succeed in doing so. The only factor
relevant is the number of attempts it takes to cross the border successfully. This equals I/1 − p. There is
some anecdotal evidence to support the assumption. For example, Espenshade (1994) argues that greater
border enforcement results in migrants making multiple attempts at crossing the border before they ﬁnally
succeed in evading the border patrol. Along similar lines, Hanson et. al. (2001, p.44) note that: “Each time
a migrant is caught, he or she is detained and sent back across the border, usually within a few days. This
allows the migrant to make two or more attempts at illegal entry within a period as short as a week.”
15 The assumption is necessary and suﬃcient for at least some people to migrate but not all when p = η =0
(free migration case). The qualitative nature of our results is unaﬀected by the assumption.
11are all agents with C ≤ ˜ λ(1 − p) and who are not selected for legal migration. The total
migration cost of a typical illegal migrant is equal to C(1 − p)−1 in expected value where
expected value is taken over the number of attempts he makes to cross the border. Thus,
the total migration cost of the average illegal migrant is equal to ˜ λ/2 a n dh i ss u r p l u si sa l s o
equal to ˜ λ/2. This explains the coeﬃcient of I in Ws.16
It is important to note here that the surpluses of the average legal and illegal migrant
are diﬀerent only due to a positive η value. This may seem surprising at ﬁrst but is actually
quite simple. Since illegal migration involves more than one attempt, the beneﬁtf r o mi t
is lower than from legal migration for any given agent. However, since illegal migration is
more costly due to multiple attempts, only the relatively low-cost agents attempt it (positive
selection). In other words, the C value of the average illegal migrant is ˜ λ(1 − p)/2 while
the C value for the average legal migrant is higher and equal to λ/2. This makes illegal
migration more desirable than legal migration to the source country. Putting these two
competing eﬀects together we ﬁnd that they cancel out so that the beneﬁt from legal and
illegal migration diﬀers only because of a positive η value. The positive selection in illegal
migration can be equivalently interpreted as a negative selection in legal migration. We will
use both these interpretations.
The importance of the selection process for source and host countries has been noted
in the literature although not in the precise sense analyzed in this paper. For example,
Chiswick (2000) notes that:
16 Some care is needed in interpreting Ws in terms of L,I as derived above. The reason for this is that I is
not a direct policy parameter: countries choose, L,p and η which determines I. Therefore, for any given L,η
v a l u eau n i ti n c r e a s ei nI implies that p changes appropriately to eﬀect the change in I under consideration.
The same argument applies to changes in I arising from a change in L or/and η.
12“Among countries for whom entry restrictions are binding, the criteria for ra-
tioning immigration visas (demand) will inﬂuence the favorable selectivity of
those who actually migrate.” Continuing further he states: “Whether migrants
are favorably selected or not is important for understanding the economic and
sociological consequences of migration for the sending (origin) and receiving (des-
tination) regions, as well as for the migrants themselves. .... As a consequence,
the extent of favorable selectivity of migrants will eﬀect the immigration policies
of the destination and emigration policies of the origin. Immigration history,
and as a result, the histories of the origin and destination regions are thereby
inﬂuenced by the selectivity of migrants.”
The result that legal and illegal migration are perfect substitutes in the source country’s
welfare function when η =0is speciﬁc to the structure of our model. However, the basic
result, a positive selection in illegal migration, is suﬃciently general and the qualitative
nature of our results will be preserved in other model speciﬁcations.17
We summarize some of the results above as follows.
17 In more general settings than ours, the source country’s preferences over total migration and the com-
position of migration will depend on the distribution of C and other factors which determine the net beneﬁt
from legal over illegal migration. It is not obvious how the cost of illegal and legal migration diﬀer partly
because the impact of border enforcement on illegal migration is diﬃcult to observe (Hanson et. al., 2001).
However, there is strong evidence favoring our main idea that higher border enforcement implies that a larger
number of attempts are needed for a successful border crossing. For example, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)
ﬁnd that a 10% increase in border enforcement leads to an 8% to 10% increase in border apprehensions along
the U.S.-Mexico border. There is also some evidence that an illegal immigrant may choose to cross the border
at remote locations such as in the Arizona desert to improve the likelihood of successful entry (Cornelius,
2000). In our model we have ruled out this possibility for the simple reason that while these routes imply
ah i g h e rC for an illegal migrant than a legal one, however, the probability of getting caught is also lower.
Hence, it is not clear how the total cost of illegal migration varies over remote and more traditional routes.
13Result 1: If all agents have an equal chance of being selected for a GW scheme, then such
schemes involve negative selection, in that high-cost agents who would not migrate illegally
get selected for legal migration. The beneﬁt to source from substituting illegal with legal
migration is therefore signiﬁcantly eroded. In our simple linear model, the potential beneﬁti s
completely eliminated iﬀ η =0leaving the source indiﬀerent to the composition of migration.
The impact of GW scheme for host countries is as follows. From equation (1) it is evident
that total migration, I +L, is strictly increasing in L except when there is a free-border and
no internal sanctions (p =0 ,η =0 ) . Formally, for any given p, dI/dL = −˜ λ(1−p)/λ which
is less than one in absolute value. Thus, if L rises by 1 unit then total migration will rise by
1 − ˜ λ(1 − p)/λ > 0 for all p>0. For brevity, call this the leakage eﬀect. Intuitively, while
the GW scheme has no eﬀect on the incentives of those who would have migrated illegally
anyway, it allows some agents to migrate legally who would not have emigrated illegally
because of their high C value.18 We summarize the ﬁnding as follows.
Result 2: Total migration (legal plus illegal) rises with the size of a GW scheme because
such schemes induce the migration of high-cost agents who would otherwise not have mi-
grated. Host countries that are primarily interested in controlling total migration, and are
not concerned about its composition, will be made worse oﬀ by such schemes if they are
implemented unilaterally.
18 That is, all agents selected for the GW scheme with λ >C>˜ λ(1 − p).
142.3 Nash equilibrium policies
The unilaterally optimal policy of the source country is to set Es =0since this avoids
the cost of E∗
s and ensures minimum p given host’s strategy. Note that ∂Ws/∂p = −˜ λ
2
(λ−
L)/2λ < 0. With Es =0 , we have
Wh = wh − SLL − SII
The expression for Wh shows that immigration (legal or illegal) is always detrimental to host’s
welfare. This result is due to the simple structure of our model where gain in consumer
surplus to natives from immigration has been ruled out for three reasons. Firstly, it simpliﬁes
the algebra considerably and allows us to draw sharp results. Secondly, the qualitative
nature of results is unaﬀected because on pure economic grounds (gain in consumer surplus)
the host and source are indiﬀerent between legal and illegal migration.19 Thirdly, the
assumption enables us to focus on the situation where there is excessive immigration from
the host perspective and GW schemes are used purely to facilitate cooperation on illegal
migration, which is the central concern of this paper.20
Diﬀerentiating we get ∂Wh/∂p = ˜ λSI(λ − L)/λ, ∂Wh/∂L = ˜ λSI(1 − p)/λ − SL, and
∂Ws/∂L = λ/2 − ˜ λ
2
(1 − p)/2λ > 0.21 The Nash equilibrium values of p,L lie at a corner.
19 That is, a change in the status (legal vs. illegal) of an immigrant aﬀects host’s welfare due to the
diﬀerence between SI,S L and the source’s welfare due to the diﬀerence in the migration cost ad the wage
diﬀerential between legal and illegal migrants. After controlling for these eﬀects in our model we are left with
the output produced. Since a mere change in the status has no eﬀect on output and hence consumer surplus,
host’s preference between legal and illegal immigration is unaﬀected by the inclusion of consumer surplus in
the model. The same applies to the source.
20 In a companion paper we allow for beneﬁcial eﬀects of immigration through increased consumer surplus
to natives and show that the desirability of legal over illegal migration to host and source is still driven by
the same factors as highlighted in this paper.
21 The previous two inequalities are strict at interior values.
15There are three possible corner solutions which are stated in Appendix A2. Throughout the
p a p e rw ew i l lf o c u so no n es u c hs o l u t i o ng i v e nb y :
p =¯ p,L =0if and only if
λSL
1 − ¯ p
> ˜ λSI > 0
Interpretation of the Nash equilibrium is as follows. The host ideally prefers no legal
or illegal migration. If the capacity limit, ¯ p, is suﬃciently close to one then, irrespective of
η, the optimal policy of the host is to set L =0and p =¯ p. This provides us with a useful
result in that any use of legal migration in the Nash equilibrium must then be due to the
diﬃculty in sealing the border suﬃciently well. It is also simple to see from the solution
that there are beneﬁts and costs to the host in using legal migration. The beneﬁti st h a t
to the extent legal migration substitutes illegal migration, total social cost decreases (when
SL <S I). The cost is that legal migration is not a perfect substitute for illegal migration
due to the leakage eﬀect, so that total migration rises with L which pushes host’s welfare
downwards. It is straightforward to verify from the full solution in Appendix A2 that if
the leakage eﬀect were absent or suﬃciently small (small ¯ p,η values) then the unique Nash
equilibrium would feature full legal migration and no illegal migration.22
Assumption 2: In the remainder of the paper we assume that the condition stated in the
solution above is satisﬁed so that p =¯ p and L =0in the Nash equilibrium.
22 That is, as ¯ p → 0 and η → 0, then d(I + L)/dL → 0. From Appendix A2 we can see that this implies
that L → λ. Intuitively, if there is no leakage eﬀect then a unit increase in L will reduce I by one unit. Host’s
welfare will consequently rise with SI >S L.
162.4 Optimal η value
The impact on host’s welfare from a change in η can be decomposed into two parts: the
direct impact when the Nash equilibrium values of p,L stated above do not change, and the
indirect impact when the solution shifts from one corner to another. Throughout the paper
we will focus on the former only by appropriate choice of restrictions on the parameters.23
The motivation for doing so is that in more general settings than ours where the solution
is interior, changes in solution values with respect to η will have only a second order eﬀect
on Wh while the ﬁrst order eﬀects will come from the direct changes that we analyze in the
paper.
Host’s marginal beneﬁtf r o mη with p,L set optimally at their Nash equilibrium levels
is given by:
dWh/dη =( 1− ¯ p)SI − (1 − ¯ p)˜ λS 
I(η)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of the equation captures the beneﬁtt oh o s t
from lower illegal migration when η rises. The second term captures the cost to the host
due to the movement in SI and is evaluated at the original migration level. Throughout the
paper we will assume that d2SI/dη2 > 0 and is suﬃciently large so that the second order
maximization condition over η is globally satisﬁed.24 Let ηN denote the Nash equilibrium
value of η.25
23 See Assumption 2 below for the appropriate restrictions.
24 As u ﬃcient condition for this is that 2S
 
I(1− ¯ p)−˜ λ(1− ¯ p)d
2SI/dη
2 < 0 for all η. Assume that this holds
in the remainder of the paper.
25 Under the assumptions stated in the paragraph η
N is well deﬁned and unique.
17Section 3: Cooperation with transfers
The scope for cooperation depends on the structure of externalities across countries
from unilateral actions and the set of policy instruments open to negotiations. Throughout
we will assume that negotiations occur over p,L (with and without transfers) but η is not
negotiated. The assumption broadly reﬂects the experience that the rights of illegal aliens
are not formally negotiated with source countries. Further, it allows us to focus squarely on
what can and cannot be achieved using GW schemes alone.
3.1 International externalities and cooperation
There are two types of international externalities. The source country’s decision to do
nothing in the Nash equilibrium lowers host’s welfare by keeping p low. If this were the only
externality, then global welfare would be enhanced by source country’s participation and a
higher value of p provided that the ﬁxed cost of E∗
s is not too high. However, host’s actions
also have a negative eﬀect on the source country. Higher p and lower L reduce Ws implying
that a more liberal migration regime (lower p and higher L) would enhance global welfare.
While both these possible types of externality exist, we assume in this paper that the former
dominates. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this case are stated below.26
In this section we analyze the scope for cooperation when lump sum transfers can be
made internationally (the transfer regime). We assume throughout the remaining paper
26 In a companion paper we discuss the more general case where the dominant externality could be either
of the two mentioned above.
18that the host has complete bargaining power.27 The cooperative game is as follows. In
the ﬁrst stage the host announces η value which is ﬁxed thereafter. In the second stage
countries negotiate and implement an agreement over L,p, T and Es where T is the transfer
from the host to source.28
With transfers available, the cooperative outcome maximizes the joint welfare of the two
countries and transfers are used to keep the source country’s welfare at its Nash equilibrium
level which equals WN
s (ηN)=ws+˜ λ
2
(1−¯ p)/2. Because of the linear structure of the model,
there are four possible cooperative outcomes depending upon the underlying parameter val-
ues: (i) free illegal migration, i.e. p =0 ,L=0 ,E s =0 ;(ii) free legal migration, i.e. p =0 ,
L = λ,E s =0 ;(iii) Nash equilibrium with p =¯ p, L = Es =0 ;and (iv) full enforcement, i.e.
p = p∗,L=0and Es = E∗
s which is our proposed solution.
The full enforcement equilibrium (iv), in which the source country participates in border
enforcement, is globally eﬃcient if and only if it yields higher global welfare than the outcomes
in (i)-(iii) above. Comparing (iv) with (i) to (iii) gives us the following conditions:
E∗
s < (SI − ˜ λ/2)˜ λp∗ .... C1
E∗
s < ˜ λ(1 − p∗)(˜ λ/2 − SI) − λ(λ/2 − SL) .... C2
E∗
s < ˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p)(SI − ˜ λ/2) .... C3
Interpretation of conditions C1 − C3 is as follows. C1 rules out the possibility that global
welfare is higher in a borderless world (p =0 ,L =0 ) relative to the proposed cooperative
27 The assumption simpliﬁes the algebra and allows us to distinguish our results from the ones in the
literature where an agent (host in our model) with less than full bargaining power can beneﬁt from a strategic
move (adjusting η value) made prior to the bargaining game.
28 When T is negative it would imply a transfer from source to host.
19case (p = p∗,L =0 ). In short, “free illegal migration” is ruled out. The restriction is mild
given that our focus is on cooperation in reducing illegal migration.29 Similarly C3 is
necessary and suﬃcient for global welfare to be higher at the proposed cooperative solution
than at the Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, this means that the cost of increasing p through
the source country’s participation is globally aﬀordable.
The substantive condition is C2 under which global welfare is higher in the proposed
cooperative case than with free legal migration. This condition means that the aggregate
impact of legal migration on global welfare outweighs the cost savings from eliminating border
enforcement. Hence, given C1,C3, under C2 transfers are strictly preferred to an expanded
GW scheme as a means of compensating the source, and the latter is at most a second best
instrument for fostering international cooperation.30
Whether C2 holds will depend on the direct eﬀect of legal migration on global welfare,
as well as its indirect eﬀect on welfare through the induced change in illegal migration The
selection process and the leakage eﬀect outlined above inﬂuence the magnitude of both these
eﬀects. Thus the negative selection in legal migration implies a lower value of λ/2 − SL,
the global net surplus from a unit increase in legal migration. And the positive selection in
illegal migration implies a higher value of ˜ λ/2−SI, the global net surplus from a unit increase
in illegal migration. Both these eﬀects make C2 more likely to hold than otherwise. Since
29 With Assumption 2 holding, a cooperative outcome with free illegal migration would require transfers
from source to host (T<0) which are rarely observed in the real world. Hence we believe that ruling out
this possibility does not involve much loss of generality. In a companion paper we discuss the possibility of
free illegal migration as an equilibrium outcome in more detail.
30 We note here that C2 also rules out the cooperative outcome where the source bribes the host through
transfers for more legal migration. Motivation for ruling out this case has been already discussed above. Thus,
C2 not only ensures that GW is not used as a compensating device in the cooperative eﬀort but also ensures
that selling legal migration in return for transfers is not optimal.
20illegal migration is globally undesirable (by C1), the leakage eﬀect makes the use of legal
migration less attractive in the cooperative process. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of ˜ λ/2 − SI
in C2 captures the leakage eﬀect and the larger the eﬀect the more likely that C2 holds.
Summarizing the discussion above, we get the following Result.
Result 3: Under Assumptions 1,2 and conditions C1−C3, transfers are the ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c y
instrument for sustaining cooperation over illegal migration and are strictly preferable to GW
schemes. GW schemes create additional distortions and are only a second best instrument.
Computing the welfare of the host country in the cooperative outcome with transfers
we have
WT
h (η) ≡ wh − SI˜ λ(1 − p∗) − T(η)
where T(η)=E∗
s + ˜ λ
2
(p∗ − ¯ p)/2 is the amount of transfer from host to source.
3.2 Optimal η value
There are two competing ways in which a higher η aﬀects WT
h : lower transfers and
lower illegal immigration versus host’s (dis)utility from tougher sanctions on immigrants.
Formally, the marginal beneﬁtf u n c t i o na n dt h eﬁrst order optimality condition for η is
∂WT
h /∂η = ˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p)+( 1− p∗)[SI(η) − ˜ λS 
I(η)] = 0 .... (3)31
31 The partial derivative indicates that p,L are held ﬁxed at p
∗,0 respectively which is also optimal for
the cooperative game being considered here. As above, we are assuming here that conditions C1 − C3 and
Assumptions 1,2 are satisﬁed for all η ∈ [0,η1].
21The equation diﬀers qualitatively from ∂Wh/∂η due to the ﬁrst term, ˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p)=−∂T/∂η.
Interpretation of ∂T/∂η is as follows. When p rises from ¯ p to p∗ source country’s welfare
decreases by (˜ λ/2)[I(¯ p,0) − I(p∗,0)] a n dt h eh o s tm u s tm a k eat r a n s f e ro fa na m o u n te q u a l
to this loss.32 This loss is the forgone surplus of would-be illegal aliens. An increase in η
alters the size of this loss in two ways. Firstly, the surplus of the average illegal immigrant
(˜ λ/2) decreases implying a smaller loss to source. Secondly, reduction in illegal migration
(I(¯ p,0)−I(p∗,0)) is smaller at a higher η value which again implies a smaller loss to source.
On both these counts the compensatory transfer decreases. Let ηT denote the solution value
of η.33 Without much loss of generality we will assume that ∂WT
h /∂η =0at ηT.34
It is simple to see that ηT > ηN ( e x c e p ta tc o r n e rs o l u t i o n s ) . T h a ti s ,a tη = ηN,
∂WT
h /∂η is equal to ˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p) which being strictly positive implies that η will be revised
upwards from its Nash equilibrium level in the transfer regime. This is simply the extra
beneﬁt to host from increasing η to reduce the transfer amount to the source country which
is completely absent when there is no-cooperation.35 We state this formally in the following
Result:
Result 4: Suppose that conditions C1−C3 hold and the Nash equilibrium involves p =¯ p and
32 Also, the transfer must compensate the source for the ﬁxed cost, E
∗
s, it incurs.
33 Assume that the W
T
h is globally concave in η with appropriate restrictions on the structure of SI.
34 That is, we are ruling out corner solutions with the ﬁrst order condition in (3) may not hold. Note that
this does not rule out corner solutions since (3) can hold at η =0or η1.
35 It is possible that η
N may be equal to η
T when the solution occurs at the corner. Also, if η
N or η
T
have multiple solutions then it is impossible to compare their values as the comparison will depend on which
solution values we pick. However, the general point remains that in addition to the direct eﬀect of η on host’s
welfare, the incentive to lower the transfer amount provides an additional beneﬁtf r o mi n c r e a s i n gη to host
under cooperation with transfers relative to the Nash equilibrium case.
22L =0as stated above. The beneﬁt to host from an increase in η is higher under cooperation
with transfers than in the Nash equilibrium. The reason is that higher η reduces the
transfer that the host needs to make to the source, an eﬀect that is absent when there is
no-cooperation.
Section 4: Cooperation without transfers
In this section we analyze cooperation without transfers (the GW regime). This issue is
important because many countries are averse to the idea of international transfer payments
on ethical or budgetary grounds.
4.1 Solution to the second stage
For any given η, the cooperative outcome is obtained by maximizing Wh over p,L subject
to the participation constraint (PC) that the source country’s welfare is no less than the Nash




s + ˜ λ
2
(p − ¯ p)
λ − ˜ λ
2
(1 − p)/λ
≡ L(p,η) where p ≥ ¯ p
36 For simplicity, we are assuming here and elsewhere in the paper that the host has all the bargaining
power and extracts the entire surplus from cooperation. The assumption is not important for the qualitative
nature of our results.
23It can be checked that L(p,η) is increasing and concave in p. The no-cooperation case in
the GW regime occurs when p =¯ p, Es =0and it satisﬁes the PC.
The key question we address here is whether the potential gains from cooperation can
be realized using the GW scheme alone (i.e., without transfers) and how does the optimal
value of η diﬀer between the GW regime and the transfer regime. We have two main results.
The ﬁrst is that due to their second best nature, GW schemes are a more costly way of
achieving cooperation than transfers, implying less surplus from cooperation. Further, in
many situations GW schemes are completely ineﬀective in sustaining cooperation. Our
second broad ﬁnding is that this ineﬃcacy of GW schemes in fostering cooperation creates
additional incentives for the host to implement tougher measures (η value) against illegal
immigrants compared to the case with transfers. Consequently, optimal η is higher in the
GW regime than in the transfer regime.
4.2: Structure of cooperation in the GW regime
Treating η as exogenously given we derive here the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
under which cooperation occurs in the GW regime and the optimal value of p.W e t h e n
derive the optimal value of η and compare it with the one for the transfer regime.
Maintain Assumptions 1,2 and C1−C3 throughout. Let pc denote the optimal value of
p under cooperation in the GW regime. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for cooperation
to occur are:
L(¯ p,η) < λ
˜ λSL < λSI
24˜ λSI(p∗ − ¯ p) < [SL − SI˜ λ(1 − p∗)/λ]L(p∗,η)
Interpretation of these conditions is as follows. In the cooperative outcome pc > ¯ p for
otherwise the host can achieve the same value unilaterally without having to pay for E∗
s.
The amount of legal migration the host has to oﬀer to satisfy the PC equals L(¯ p,η),f o r
the ﬁxed cost incurred by the source plus an extra amount to compensate the source for
pc above ¯ p. However, the maximum possible legal migration in our model is λ. Thus,
L(¯ p,η) < λ is a necessary condition for PC to be satisﬁed at any pc > ¯ p. Now consider the
second condition and note that it is violated iﬀ η =0and SI = SL,i . e .i fb o t ht h es o u r c e
and host are indiﬀerent to the composition of migrants between legal and illegal. From
the welfare function of the two countries, it is simple to see that no-cooperation will result
here because the only way the host can beneﬁt from cooperation is if total migration falls
below its Nash equilibrium level but this would make the source worse oﬀ, violating the PC.
Finally, consider the last condition. Along the PC, the host’s marginal beneﬁtf u n c t i o ni n
p is: dWGW
h /dp = ˜ λ(λ−L)(λSI − ˜ λSL)/D where D ≡ λ− ˜ λ
2
(1−p)/λ > 0 and L = L(p,η).
Under the ﬁrst two necessary conditions stated, the marginal beneﬁt is strictly positive for all
p implying that pc = p∗ and L equals L(p∗,η) ≡ L∗. To ensure that cooperation is beneﬁcial
we need the host’s welfare at p∗,L ∗ to be strictly higher than in the Nash equilibrium, which
gives us the stated condition.37 This completes our discussion of the nature of cooperation
for any given η.
4.3: Optimal η when cooperation occurs
37 It can be checked that L(p
∗,η) < λ when the ﬁrst necessary condition, L(¯ p,η) < λ, is satisﬁed.
25Suppose that the necessary and suﬃcient conditions stated above hold so that coopera-














˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p) − ∂WT
h /∂η

(1 − L∗/λ) ... (4)
where W∗
s is source country’s welfare at p∗,L ∗ and WN
s is the same in the Nash equilibrium,
∂WT
h /∂η is host’s marginal beneﬁt from η in the transfer regime (equation 3), ∂Wh/∂L and
∂Ws/∂L i nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e ta r ed e r i v e dt r e a t i n gη and p ﬁxed.
Interpretation of (4) is as follows. The last term is the direct eﬀect (treating L,p ﬁxed)
of η on host’s welfare and is the same as in section 2. We have expressed it in terms of
∂WT
h /∂η for easy comparison with the transfer regime. The second term, ∂(W∗
s −WN
s )/∂η,
is the strategic eﬀect of η on the cooperative outcome. That is, keeping p,L ﬁxed, a higher
η lowers the source country’s welfare in the Nash equilibrium (threat point) as well as its
welfare at p∗,L ∗. If W∗
s − WN
s falls then the host needs to make a smaller compensation
measured in source’s utility terms to source to ensure its cooperation. To convert this change
in compensation into units of L we merely need to divide it by the marginal utility to source
from L which explains the ∂Ws/∂L term in the square bracket. Lastly, to obtain the implied
increase in host’s welfare from this reduced L, we multiply the change in L with −∂Wh/∂L
which explains the numerator in the square bracket. We can now compare the optimal η
here with the one in the transfer regime and interpret the ﬁnding in terms of the selection
eﬀect and the leakage eﬀect discussed above.
Set η = ηT in (4) so that ∂WT
h /∂η =0 . We have to show that the resulting expression
in (4) is strictly positive, which would imply an incentive for the host to revise η above ηT.
26Substituting for the various terms we can rewrite RHS in (4) as:
%
SL − SI(1 − p∗)˜ λ/λ




˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p)+˜ λ(1 − p∗)L∗/λ
r
− ˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p)(1 − L∗/λ) ... (5)
where the terms in (5) exactly match the corresponding terms on RHS of (4). For (5) to
be positive, a necessary condition is that SL − SI(1 − p∗)˜ λ/λ > 0:i.e., the leakage eﬀect is
present and that it makes makes the host worse oﬀ from any increase in L at p∗,ηT.I t c a n
be checked that this necessary condition is implied by C2.38 With the necessary condition
satisﬁed we now check for a suﬃcient condition for (5) to be positive. To this end focus on
the ratio in the square bracket which if greater than unity will ensure that (5) is positive
(suﬃcient condition). The denominator in the ratio equals ∂Ws/∂L while the numerator
equals −∂Wh/∂L. The negative selection in legal migration implies a lower value of the
denominator term which tends to push the ratio higher.39 A larger leakage eﬀect (higher
p∗ value) has two eﬀects on the ratio. It increases the value of the numerator as well as
the denominator. The latter rises because the leakage eﬀect makes legal migration more
a t t r a c t i v et ot h es o u r c ec o u n t r yw h i l et h ef o r m e rr i s e sb e c a u s et h et h el e a k a g ee ﬀect increases
illegal migration making the host worse oﬀ. It can be checked that the overall ratio always
rises with the leakage eﬀect simply because illegal migration is globally undesirable (under
C1 − C3): the beneﬁt to source is less than the loss to the host from an increase in illegal
38 See Appendix A4 for details.
39 The selection eﬀect has no impact on the value of the numerator.
27migration. Thus, the selection eﬀect and the leakage eﬀe c tt e n dt op u s ht h ev a l u eo ft h e
ratio upwards. It can be easily checked that condition C2 ensures that these eﬀects are
suﬃciently strong so that the ratio is strictly greater than one. Thus, sitting at η = ηT,
host’s beneﬁt from revising η upwards is strictly positive implying a higher optimal η in the
GW regime than in the transfer regime.
4.4 Optimal η when no-cooperation occurs
In this part, we consider situations where no-cooperation results in the GW regime in
the absence of tough laws against illegal immigrants. We show that the host then has
an incentive to implement tough laws in order to induce the source to cooperate. We
appropriately benchmark the model so that under the same conditions (parameter values)
the host has no incentive to implement tough laws if transfers were available. While there
are many situations where this result holds, we show one such situation below, highlighting
the basic eﬀects driving the outcome.
Maintain Assumptions 1,2 and conditions C1 − C3 so that the cooperative outcome
in the transfer regime is as stated in section 3. Impose the benchmark condition so that
ηT =0 . The proof involves ﬁrst showing that with η = ηT =0there is no-cooperation
and then showing that the host can achieve some cooperation by raising η above ηT and is
thereby better oﬀ.
Now set η =0 . Maintain the necessary conditions for cooperation to occur stated above:
L(¯ p,0) < λ which is equivalent to E∗
s <E 1 ≡ λ2¯ p/2 and SI(0) >S L. No-cooperation occurs
iﬀ host’s welfare in the Nash equilibrium is greater than at p∗,L(p∗,0). This is equivalent
28to the following condition holding:




s − λ2¯ p
λp∗

≥ λSI(p∗ − ¯ p)
RHS of the inequality is the beneﬁt to host from lower illegal migration due to the increase
in p under cooperation while the LHS is the total loss to host from the expanded GW
scheme. From C2 we know that the ﬁrst term on LHS is strictly positive implying that
LHS is strictly increasing in E∗
s. It is easy to verify that the inequality is strictly violated at
E∗
s =0and strictly satisﬁed at E∗
s = E1. Thus, there is exists a critical value of E∗
s at which
LHS=RHS implying that the host is indiﬀerent between the cooperative outcome and the
Nash equilibrium. Now consider the case when E∗
s is equal to this critical value. What we
have now is no-cooperation in the GW regime when η = ηT =0 . Since all these conditions
are consistent with C1 − C3 and Assumptions 1,2, the structure of cooperation if transfers
were available is same as in section 3.
We are left to show that the host can achieve some cooperation by raising η and that
doing so is optimal for it. To see this suppose that the host moves from no-cooperation and
η =0to a cooperative outcome with p = p∗,L= L(p∗,0) ﬁrst and then revises η upwards
by a small amount. The change in p and L with η =0will have no eﬀect on host’s welfare
as stated above. The marginal impact of the revision in η on host’s welfare evaluated at
η =0 ,p= p∗,L= L(p∗,0) is given by:
∂Wh/∂η =[ SL − (1 − p∗)SI]|dL(.)/dη| +( 1− p∗)[SI − (λ − L)S 
I]
where |dL(.)/dη| =
2λ(p∗ − ¯ p)+2 L(1 − p∗)
λp∗ > 0. The ﬁrst term on RHS is the beneﬁtt o
host due to a lower L needed to induce the source to cooperate when η rises and the second
29term is the direct eﬀect (i.e., for ﬁxed L) from higher η. Imposing the benchmark condition
from equation (3) for ηT =0w eg e tt h a tas u ﬃcient condition for ∂Wh/∂η above to be
strictly positive is that SL−(1−p∗)SI >p ∗λ/2. It can be easily checked that this inequality
is implied by C2. Thus, the host is able to sustain mutually beneﬁcial cooperation by revising
η above ηT and is thereby better oﬀ than with η =0 . In words, we have identiﬁed parameter
values for which cooperation occurs in the transfer regime and the optimal value of η equals
zero. However, due to their second best nature (condition C2), GW schemes are unable to
sustain any cooperation without tough laws against the illegal population. The host then
has an incentive to implement tough laws to achieve some cooperation making itself better
oﬀ in the process. This completes the proof.
We summarize the results here in the following way.
Result 5: In a wide range of situations, no beneﬁcial cooperation can be achieved using GW
schemes and weak laws against illegal immigrants (η =0 ) . The host then ﬁnds it optimal
to implement tough laws to sustain cooperation and thereby improve its welfare. Even in
situations where GW schemes are successful in sustaining cooperation , they are a costly
way of compensating the source for its eﬀort at controlling illegal migration. The host then
has an incentive to reduce this cost by implementing tough laws against illegal aliens (high η
value). The incentive to use tough laws is much weaker when the more eﬃcient tool, namely
transfers, is available as a compensating device.
30Conclusion
While cooperation between host and source countries to deal with illegal immigration is
undeniably desirable, the choice of instruments of cooperation is critical. An aversion, for
ﬁscal or political reasons, to the use of transfers can make limited legal migration schemes
seem an attractive alternative. A number of governments are today ﬂirting with guest
worker schemes. Such schemes are likely to reduce the level of illegal migration simply
because some of those who would have migrated illegally will choose instead the legal route.
This substitution eﬀect by itself is likely to be of limited use given the magnitude of illegal
migration pressures. The more important consideration, therefore, is whether such schemes
can induce source countries to cooperate in limiting illegal migration. This paper has
identiﬁed serious problems in this regard. We have shown that legal migration channels
suﬀer from negative selection and leakage problems which reduce their attractiveness to the
source and the host, respectively. Therefore, sustaining cooperation through such channels
is not ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c yi nt h a tt h ep o t e n t i a lb e n e ﬁts from cooperation cannot be fully reaped.
It is also signiﬁcant that the choice of instrument can have a bearing on the broader
policy environment. In particular, the use of legal migration creates additional pressure on
the host to implement tough laws against the illegal immigrants present in the country even
when the host is otherwise averse to such measures. Thus, less favorable treatment of illegal
immigrants, as in California Proposition 187, may be an inevitable rather than incidental
outcome of reliance on guest worker schemes. In contrast, countries that are willing to use
transfers and other forms of economic assistance to induce source countries to cooperate can
31aﬀord relatively liberal treatment of illegal immigrants.
We made a number of simplifying assumptions to obtain the main results. But we
believe that the selection and the leakage eﬀect are suﬃciently general and would survive
in richer model speciﬁcations yielding results similar to those we found. Of course, it is
entirely plausible that other aspects of legal and illegal migration not captured by our simple
model may alter the results. One possibility is that there are potential global beneﬁts from
legal migration which we ruled out. In a companion paper we explore this aspect in detail.
Another important issue is the duration of migration, because guest worker schemes are
conceived of as temporary presence schemes whereas illegal migration often leads to longer
term presence. How this aﬀects our results will depend on the dynamic eﬀects of the two
types of migration. This is a fruitful area for future work.
We have also assumed that guest worker schemes cannot target individuals. Both weak-
nesses of GW schemes highlighted above could be reduced and even eliminated if eﬀective
targeting were feasible, but for several reasons this seems unlikely. First, it is doubtful that
governments can obtain the necessary information. In our simple model governments would
need to know individuals’ migration costs, but in a more general setting governments would
be required to distinguish potential migrants by their contribution to the source country’s
national welfare. Secondly, the preferences of the source and host may diverge on migrant
selection. For example, while the host may like potential illegal migrants to be drawn into
the guest worker program, the source may prefer to use the program to facilitate the migra-
tion of those who would otherwise not migrate. This problem would also dampen incentives
for information sharing between source and host. Finally, the host itself may need to balance
32the desire to divert potential illegal migrants into the guest worker scheme against the desire
to attract individuals who would contribute most to the host country’s national welfare. All
these considerations suggest that perfect sorting may be neither feasible nor desirable.
Illegal migration is perhaps the least understood area as far as empirical work is con-
cerned. This paper identiﬁes a number of issues that merit more attention. At a broad
level, these issues relate to the preference structure of source and host countries over legal
and illegal migration, the equilibrium relationship between the two forms of migration and
the border enforcement technology. Firstly, a host country’s preference between legal and
illegal migration depends on the pure cost of illegality. There is some empirical work on
factors that shape natives’ preference towards illegal immigration and amnesties. However,
this work has failed to distinguish between aversion to pure illegality and the social cost of
legal migration (unwanted migration). Our results have shown that this distinction is impor-
tant in designing optimal migration policies. Similarly, an understanding of source country’s
preference for legal over illegal migration is crucial in any eﬀort to seek their participation in
building an international migration policy. Secondly, there is no empirical evidence on how
legal migration impacts upon the level and structure of illegal migration. Future work in the
area can help understand the empirical signiﬁcance of the leakage and selection eﬀects which
we have shown to be important from the policy point of view. Lastly, the border enforcement
technology continues to be a black box. How source country’s cooperation aﬀects the eﬃcacy
of border enforcement measures is even less well understood. It is hoped that demonstrating
the signiﬁcance of these issues will promote more empirical research in this area.
33Appendix A
Appendix A1: A more general structure of migration cost
We show that source country will have little concern for the legal/illegal composition of
migration and will be concerned mostly with total migration in more general settings than
ours provided that p is suﬃciently small as stated in Result 1. Suppose that the cost of each
attempt at crossing the border illegally involves a cost of pC1 in addition to the cost C stated
in the sections above. pC1 can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, if the agent is caught
at the border then he incurs a ﬁne of C1 or if he is detained then the income forgone during
the detention period is C1. Since this cost is incurred only if he is caught, pC1 is simply the
expected over and above C. The second interpretation is that when p r i s e sa g e n t sm a yh a v e
to pay higher coyote fees or use more remote areas for border-crossing which entails a higher
cost for each attempt at crossing the border illegally. The cost of legal migration is only C.
For any given L, the level of illegal migration equals I1 ≡ [˜ λ(1 − p) − pCI][1 − L/λ] and the
average migration cost for all illegal immigrants equals [˜ λ+φ]/2 where φ ≡ pC1/(1−p). The
welfare of the source country equals: Ws(C1) ≡ ws−Es+˜ λI1/2+λL/2−φI1/2. When η =0 ,
then Ws(C1) depends on the ratio of the composition of illegal/legal migration only through
the last term, φI1/2. It is trivial to see that this term is arbitrarily small at suﬃciently
small values of p. Thus, when border enforcement is very costly so that p is suﬃciently
small then the source country is largely interested in total migration (I1 +L) and have little
concern for legal/illegal ratio. The main results of the paper can be therefore extended to
such host/source countries.
34Appendix A2: The Nash equilibrium of the game in section 2 is as follows40 :
p =0 ,L=0if and only if ˜ λSI ≤ λSL and ˜ λSI ≤ 0
p =¯ p,L =0if and only if
λSL − α¯ p
1 − ¯ p
> ˜ λSI > 0
p =0 ,L= λ iﬀ ˜ λSI > λSL and ˜ λSI − λSL ≥ ¯ p˜ λSI
Appendix A3: Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for p = p∗,L =0and Es = E∗
s to be
globally eﬃcient under cooperation with transfers for any given η are as follows:
E∗
s < (SI − ˜ λ/2)˜ λp∗ .... C1
E∗
s < λ(SL − λ/2) − ˜ λ(1 − p∗)(SI − ˜ λ/2) .... C2
E∗
s < ˜ λ(p∗ − ¯ p)(SI − ˜ λ/2) .... C3
Assumptions 1 and 2 in the sections above hold
E x p l a n a t i o no ft h e s ec o n d i t i o n si sa sf o l l o w s . L e tΩ(p,L) denote global welfare for any given
p,L,η. Cooperation with transfers implies that cooperative outcome is one which maximizes
Ω(p,L). Because of the linear structure of the model there are only four possible cooperative
outcomes: (i) p =0 ,L=0in which case Es =0 ;(ii) p =0 ,L= λ in which case Es =0 ;
(iii) Nash equilibrium with p =¯ p, L = Es =0 ;and (iv) p = p∗,L=0and Es = E∗
s which is
our proposed solution.
The proposed solution is globally eﬃcient if and only if gives a higher global welfare
than the outcomes in (i)-(iii) above. Given Assumptions 1,2, conditions C1,C2,C3 are
40 In deriving these conditions we made use of the tie-breaking assumption that when the host indiﬀerent
between any two or all three outcomes then: p = L =0is preferred over the other two outcomes; p =0 ,L= λ
is preferred over p =¯ p,L =0 .
35necessary and suﬃcient for our proposed solution to dominate the outcomes in (i),(ii) and
(iii), respectively.
Note that C1 implies that a necessary condition for (iv) to dominate (i) is that SI > ˜ λ/2.
That is, with L =0 , lowering p from p∗ to zero will increase global welfare if the previous
inequality is violated. Interpretation of this result is that SI is the social cost on the host
from a unit increase in illegal immigrant while the loss to the host country is the wage
diﬀerential net of migration cost and the cost due to positive η value which, on an average,
equals ˜ λ/2. If the latter is larger than the former then cooperation will lead to a more liberal
border policy.
Appendix A4:
From section 3 we have C2 at ˆ p as:
λ(SL − λ/2) − ˜ λ(1 − ˆ p)(SI − ˜ λ/2) >E ∗
s ≥ 0
Rearranging we get the inequality implies that
SL − (˜ λ/λ)SI(1 − ˆ p) ≥
λ2 − ˜ λ
2
(1 − ˆ p)
2λ
The inequality implies that SL − (˜ λ/λ)SI(1 − ˆ p) ≥ 0 w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tSL −
(˜ λ/λ)SI(1 − p∗) > 0 for all p∗ > ¯ p. This completes the proof.
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